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Abstract
Using the April 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) micro dataset, we explore the racialized
and gendered effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the probability of being unemployed. The
distribution of job losses from COVID-19 for women and men or for different racial/ethnic categories has
been studied in the recent literature. We contribute to this literature by providing the first intersectional
analysis of unemployment under COVID-19, where we examine the differences in the likelihood of
unemployment across groups of White men, White women, Black men, Black women, Hispanic men and
Hispanic women. Controlling for individual characteristics such as education and age, as well as industry
and occupation effects, we show that women of all three racial/ethnic categories are more likely to be
unemployed compared to men, yet there are substantial differences across these groups based on
different unemployment measures. Hispanic women have the highest likelihood of being unemployed,
followed by Black women, who are still more likely to be unemployed than White women. We also
examine if ability to work from home has benefited any particular group in terms of lowering their
likelihood of unemployment during the pandemic. We find that in industries with a high degree of
teleworkable jobs, White women, Black men and Hispanic men are no longer more likely to be
unemployed relative to White men. However, Black women and Hispanic Women still experience a
significantly higher probability of losing their jobs compared to White men even if they are employed in
industries with highly teleworkable jobs. As we control for both individual and aggregate factors, our
results suggest that these differences are not simply the result of overrepresentation of women of color
in certain industries and occupations; rather, unobservable factors such as discrimination could be at
work.
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I. Introduction:
The COVID-19 pandemic and the social distancing measures implemented by state governments
shut down many businesses, resulted in the laying off of millions of people, and caused the unemployment
rate to jump to 14.7% in the U.S. in April 2020 from 4.4% in March 2020 (Bureau of Labor Statistics1 2020).
The impact of these job losses has been felt asymmetrically by people in different race and gender
categories of the labor force. From March to April, the percentage-point change in unemployment was
11.5% for women, 9% for men, 2.9% for Latinx, and 10% for Blacks.2 As data become available, a growing
literature began to examine the determinants and distributional consequences of pandemic-related job
losses.
In this paper, we use data from the April 2020 CPS to explore the racialized and gendered effects
of the pandemic on the probability of becoming unemployed. The distribution of job losses from COVID19 has been studied in the recent literature for women and men (Alon et al 2020; Adams-Prassl et. al.
2020), or for different racial/ethnic categories (Montenovo et. al. 2020; Fairlie et. al. 2020, Cowan 2020).
While these studies all agree that women’s unemployment increased substantially more than men’s
during the pandemic, the effects on racial/ethnic categories are not as conclusive, with some finding a
large impact for Blacks (Cowan 2020), and others suggesting the impact to be larger for Latinx (Montenovo
et. al. 2020).
We contribute to this literature by providing the first intersectional analysis of unemployment
under COVID-19, in which we examine the differences in the likelihood of unemployment across groups
of White men, White women, Black men, Black women, Hispanic men and Hispanic women. Our
intersectional analysis reveals a more nuanced picture of the COVID-19 unemployment that has already
been labeled as “she-cession” in the popular press (Gupta 2020). Our results confirm that women of all
three racial/ethnic categories are more likely to be unemployed compared to men, yet there are
substantial differences across these magnitudes under different unemployment measures. Hispanic
women have the highest likelihood of unemployment, followed by Black women, who are still more likely
to be unemployed than White women. Intersectional analysis also allows us to capture a clearer picture
of the racialized impact of COVID-19 unemployment. We find that although Hispanic men have a higher
probability of losing their jobs compared to White men, this probability is even higher for Black men.
Overall, the results of our nuanced approach clarify the inconclusive arguments in other studies about
whether Blacks or Latinx are more profoundly affected by the COVID-19 unemployment.
Much of the difference in the effect of recessions across different groups is explained by being at
greater exposure to fluctuations due to the industries and occupations of employment. While the COVID
19 pandemic has officially led to a recession of the U.S. economy, this recession has been different from
prior recessions in terms of the industries affected. With essential/non-essential classification of
industries, some of the service industries that have traditionally been considered less cyclical came to a
complete halt, while some of the typically cyclical manufacturing industries continued to operate. As the
feasibility of working from home became a crucial determinant of who gets to keep their job, a number
of studies developed measures of the feasibility of working from home (Dingel and Neiman 2020). While
it was shown that job loss was larger in occupations that cannot be performed remotely (Montenovo et
al. 2020), ours is the first study which expands the analysis to race/ethnicity-gendered categories to
1

Hereinafter BLS.
Throughout this paper we will use BLS categories of Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics. African Americans
and Blacks, and Hispanics and Latinx will be used interchangeably.
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examine whether the ability to work from home has benefited any particular group in terms of lowering
the likelihood of unemployment during the pandemic. Controlling for individual characteristics such as
education and age, as well as industry and occupation effects, we find that in industries with a high degree
of teleworkability, White women, Black men and Hispanic men are no longer more likely to be
unemployed relative to White men. However, Black women and Hispanic women still experience a
significantly higher probability of losing their jobs compared to White men, even when employed in
industries with highly teleworkable jobs.
In the next section, we briefly review the literature on the causes of the unemployment gap
between men and women and across different racial/ethnic categories. As COVID-19 related
unemployment is the result of a pandemic-induced recession, we limit our attention to the explanations
of how business cycles affect the gaps in unemployment across these groups. We show that some of the
important insights from the literature, such as the lessening of the gender gap over time, or the relative
adverse effect of recessions on men’s unemployment, are not necessarily valid for all racial/ethnic groups,
which affirms the need for intersectional analysis. In section 3, we review the existing studies of COVID19-related unemployment and more closely examine industries in which racial/ethnic groups and women
are overrepresented. Our industry-level analysis in this section shows a significantly large negative
relationship between the share of Latinx employment and the share of teleworkable jobs in an industry.
A similar negative relationship exists for the share of Black employment, yet we find no such relationship
for the women’s share of employment. While offering no causality, these findings suggest a possible
disproportional impact for Blacks and Latinx under the pandemic, as they are overrepresented in
industries with few teleworkable jobs. Section 4 describes the data set, two different definitions of COVID19-related unemployment and the characteristics of the unemployed by these definitions. In Section 5,
we present our empirical framework and the results from probit regression, wherein we measure the
relative likelihood of unemployment across racial/ethnic-gender categories, controlling for aggregate
factors such as industry, occupation, region, degree of teleworkability, essential/nonessential
classification of industry, as well as individual characteristics such as education and age. In this section we
also test for the interaction between racial/ethnic-gender categories and the degree of teleworkability.
Section 6 then presents a discussion and concluding remarks.
II. What We Know About Racialized and Gendered Unemployment over the Business Cycle
Among the race and gender disparities in labor market outcomes, differentials in unemployment
rates and how they change over time have been studied less than the gender or racial wage gap. In our
analysis of whether minority men and women face a higher likelihood of unemployment during the
current recession, we derive our framework from the literature on the determinants of differential
unemployment rates of Whites, minorities, and of women and men. While we focus on the differential
impact of recession on the unemployment of racial/ethnic-gender groups, the cyclical variations in
unemployment are inevitably related to the factors, which determine these groups’ relative labor market
positions over the longer term. 3 This literature helps us identify both individual characteristics and
industry (economy) related factors, which determine the likelihood of unemployment due to the
pandemic.
In her review of labor market disparities between Blacks and Whites, Bradbury (2000) proposes
four explanations for the above-average unemployment experienced by different demographic groups.
3
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The skill mismatch hypothesis emphasizes the availability of jobs, which require higher skills or
educational attainment than those possessed by Blacks on average. Work experience, typically measured
by age, also plays a role in this framework. The spatial mismatch hypothesis argues that, with racial
segregation in housing, Blacks typically reside in central city locations, which generally have poorer access
to available jobs than the residential locations of Whites. A third explanation focuses on the importance
of informal information networks in finding a job and recruiting a worker, which might work to the
disadvantage of Blacks. A fourth explanation has to do with employer discrimination and stereotyping,
which reduces both number and attractiveness of job offers to Blacks. These arguments do not necessarily
explain how the unemployment gap between advantaged and the disadvantaged groups would change
over the business cycle. However, Bradbury (2000) argues that as the labor market tightens during an
expansion, employers might make extra efforts to reduce the barriers created by spatial/skill mismatches
and informational networks. In addition, they may also find discrimination costlier. This leads to increased
hiring of Blacks and other disadvantaged groups as the economy reaches the peak of a business cycle. This
phenomenon is part of the argument made by Richard Freeman (1973) in his classical study of racial
patterns of labor market status from 1948-1972. Having found that the level of employment for Blacks
was more volatile than for Whites, and that the unemployment rate for Blacks rises more than for Whites
when the economy weakens, Freeman (1973) proposed a “last in, first out” pattern of Black employment
over the business cycle.
The empirical evidence for the “last in, first out” hypothesis does not seem to be conclusive for
all time periods and racial groups. Bradbury (2000) does find evidence that disadvantaged groups
experience larger percentage-point declines in unemployment rates than their counterparts in
advantaged groups during the expansionary periods within 1972-1990. In testing the hypothesis for the
period of 1989-2004, Couch and Fairlie (2010) find considerable evidence that Black men are the first to
be fired during downturns, and no evidence to confirm a last-hired claim. Couch et al (2016) test the
hypothesis for the period of 1996-2012, and find both Blacks and Hispanics to be fired first. For 19762016, Cajner et al (2017) find both Black and Hispanic men and women are affected by recessions
relatively more than Whites on average. They show that whereas the Hispanic/White unemployment gap
can be largely explained by differences in educational attainment, the larger Black/White unemployment
gap cannot be explained by observable characteristics. They conclude that personal and institutional
discrimination can explain the unexplained component for the unemployment gap for Blacks.
In addition to the explanations above, industrial and occupational segregation is often cited
among the reasons for the disproportionate impact of recession on the unemployment of various
demographic groups. Industrial (or occupational) segregation occurs when one demographic group is
overrepresented in a particular industry (or occupation) compared to their share in the labor force. As
suggested by Bradbury (2000), some sectors are more prone to be affected by business cycles, and if a
demographic group is concentrated in these sectors, they will be affected disproportionally by recessions.4
Hoynes et al (2012) find the impact of the Great Recession has been felt most strongly for men in general,
and Black and Hispanic workers due to the variation in cyclicality across different industries.
The role of industrial and occupational segregation has also been an important explanation for
over-time changes in the gender gap in unemployment. Before 1980, the higher unemployment rate of
4
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hiring practices.
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women compared to men was generally understood to be the result of women’s marginal attachment to
the labor force. Despite increasing labor force participation over time, women exited and/or re-entered
the labor market at higher rates, which led to higher unemployment rates. This gap virtually disappeared
after the 1980s, mostly as a result of the convergence of labor force attachment between men and women
(Albanesi and Sahin, 2018). Since 1983, women’s unemployment has displayed a less cyclical trend than
that of men, resulting in lower unemployment rates for women during recessions. Typically, mendominated industries such as durable goods manufacturing, construction and blue-collar jobs are more
cyclical, leading to disproportionate job losses for men during recessions, whereas more women tend to
be employed in less cyclical industries, such as services. Blau and Winkler (2017) state that in addition to
the convergence of labor force attachment between men and women, a decrease in the demand for
manufacturing workers, and an increase in the demand for workers in services sector, have resulted in a
relatively lower unemployment rate for women during recessions. In this sense the Great Recession was
not an anomaly according to most researchers, and has been called a “man-cession” due to the large
unemployment gap between men and women.5
In this paper, we examine the differential impact of the COVID-19 recession on unemployment by
focusing on the intersection of race and gender with the expectation that race and gender fuse to create
unique experiences for each group of gender and race/ethnicity combinations. Women have different
experiences from men and people of color have different experiences from Whites. Yet, to understand
the experience of a Latina or Black woman in the labor market requires more than understanding of the
experience of women and Latinx or Blacks. A similar suggestion has been made by Grown and Tas (2011)
who cautioned against labeling the Great Recession as a “man-cession,” hence undermining its adverse
influence on women, which can be identified through the examination of multiple labor market indicators
and incorporation of race/ethnicity into the analysis. In this study, even though our current methodology
is not able to account for the qualitative reasons for the unique experience of minority women, we will
explicitly attempt to capture the racialized and gendered outcomes of COVID-19 on unemployment by
controlling for variables that exhaust the potential explanations related to labor supply qualifications, and
industrial or occupational segregation.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of unemployment rates by combined racial/ethnic gender categories
over the last two decades, which includes the last two recessions of the U.S. economy (2001 and 20072009) before the current COVID-19 recession. The visual inspection of the figure clearly reveals a more
nuanced picture of the unemployment experiences of these groups than suggested in some of the studies
reviewed above. For example, the disappearance of the gender gap in unemployment seems only valid
for White men vs White women, while the unemployment gap for Black men and Black women displays a
different pattern regardless of business cycle phases. With the exception of 2006, Black men’s
unemployment rate has been persistently higher than Black women’s. Conversely, Hispanic women’s
unemployment has been higher than Hispanic men’s for all but the four years of the Great Recession.
Figure 1 confirms that men’s unemployment increases more than women’s unemployment during the
Great Recession for each race/ethnicity group, yet in terms of percentile-points, the change is the most
dramatic for Blacks. The gap between the unemployment rates for White men and White women reaches
2.1% in 2009, the highest in the last 30 years (from almost zero in 2006). For Black men and women, the
same gap is 4.4% in 2009, indicating that the Great “man-cession” was more severely felt by Black men
5
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than it was for White men. A motivation for our paper is to explore whether similar asymmetries exist for
different racial/ethnic categories under the COVID-19 recession (to which the term “she-cession” has
been applied).

FIGURE 1: Unemployment Rate of Race/ethnicity-Gender groups
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III. Racialized-Gendered Unemployment under the COVID-19 Recession:
Within the rapidly evolving literature focusing on COVID-19 and labor market outcomes, a handful
of studies examine the differences in the unemployment experiences of demographic groups. Among
these, Alon et al. (2020) find that, unlike a “regular” recession, social-distancing policies have had a larger
effect on women’s unemployment. Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) present similar findings for both the U.S.
and the U.K.: women and workers without a college degree are significantly more likely to have lost their
jobs. Using February and April CPS surveys, Cowan (2020) shows that, conditional on being employed in
February, women are less likely than men, and all racial minorities are less likely than Whites, to be
employed in April. Controlling for occupation and industry, the effect is particularly large for Black workers
(3.5% more likely). Fairlie et al (2020), on the other hand, suggest that, compared with the Great
Recession, Blacks did not experience a disproportionately large increase in unemployment relative to
Whites, while Hispanic workers did. Similarly, Montenovo et al. (2020) find large increases in recent
unemployment among women, Hispanics, and younger workers. While our work relates to these papers,
we further combine categories of race/ethnicity and gender to examine whether the disproportionate
likelihood of unemployment for women found in these works is an equally shared experience for White
women and women of color. Similarly, we address the question of whether there are gendered
differences within minority groups in terms of the disproportionate unemployment effects reported
above.
A cursory examination of the monthly unemployment rate for racial/ethnic-gendered categories
in Figure 2 explains why the term “she-cession” has been used in reference to the current recession. After
social distancing rules and executive orders began in March 2020, women’s unemployment reached much
6

higher levels than men’s for all racial/ethnic categories—though the gap is less visible for Black women
simply because of the relatively high pre-pandemic rate of unemployment for Black men. It also seems
the gap between unemployment rates for Hispanic women and Hispanic men reached a relatively higher
level compared to other racial/ethnic categories.
FIGURE 2: Unemployment Rate for Race/Ethinicity-Gender Groups
during the COVID-19 Pandemic
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For the COVID-19 recession, the asymmetric impact of recession on various industries and
occupations has also been identified as the primary factor determining the gendered and racialized impact
of unemployment. With essential/non-essential classification of industries, some service industries that
are typically considered less cyclical came to a complete halt while some typically-cyclical manufacturing
industries continued to operate. In their study of “essential” industries based on the executive orders
from California and Maryland, McNicholas and Poydock (2020) use a CPS database and show that women
make up the majority of essential workers in health care (76%) and government and community-based
services (73%), whereas people of color make up the majority of essential workers in food and agriculture
(50%) and in industrial, commercial, residential facilities and services (53%). Using data from the American
Community Survey (2014–2018), Rho et. al. (2020) show that women and people of color are
overrepresented in the workforce employed in “front-line" industries (e.g., grocery stores, public transit
and health care). Considering the fact that most workers in essential or “front-line” industries have kept
their jobs (as confirmed by Montenovo et al. 2020), the higher likelihood of unemployment reported for
women and minorities presents a perplexing question. In our empirical analyses of the determinants of
COVID-related unemployment, we control for essential/nonessential industry classification based on the
state of Delaware’s criteria, as done by Fairlie et al. (2020).6 To control for the disproportionate effects of
the COVID-19 recession on different segments of the economy, we also include occupation and industry
categories.
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Another highly-emphasized determinant of pandemic-related unemployment has been whether
workers can work from home. Among the growing number of studies measuring the feasibility of working
from home, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) show that workers who report they can do a high share of tasks
from home are substantially less likely to report losing their jobs due to the COVID-19 outbreak in both
the U.S. and the U.K. Dingel and Neiman (2020), who use the occupational descriptions from the
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) surveys to designate any given occupation as able or unable
to be performed at home, estimate that 37% of jobs in the US “can plausibly be performed from home.” 7
Based on their occupational classification they also show there is significant variation in the share of
teleworkable jobs across industries. As expected, most jobs in finance, corporate management, and
professional and scientific services could plausibly be performed at home, whereas very few jobs in
agriculture, hotels and restaurants, or retail can be.8 Using survey data, Brynjolfsson et al. (2020) find the
fraction of workers who switched to working from home by May 2020 to be about 35.2%, not far from
Dingel and Neiman (2020)’s estimate. Likewise, Bartik et al (2020) find that the Dingel and Neiman
classification of work from home capacity is indeed a strong predictor of industry-level variation in remote
workability during the pandemic. Dingel and Neiman (2020) classification has been influential both in
research and in practice as a way to understand the potential for remote work across industries and
demographic groups. Using this measure, Yasenov (2020) shows that lower-wage workers are up to three
times less likely to be able to work from home than higher-wage workers. Those with lower levels of
education, younger adults, ethnic minorities and immigrants are also concentrated in occupations that
are less likely to be performed from home. Whereas the opportunity to telework would reduce the
likelihood of unemployment, to the extent that women and minorities are underrepresented in these
industries, high teleworkability might not provide any benefit to these groups. Having shown that a lower
share of women is employed in highly teleworkable occupations compared to occupations with a low
degree of teleworkability, Alon et al. (2020) suggest that “more women potentially face loss of
employment” in these less teleworkable jobs. 9 We contribute to this literature by expanding the analysis
to race/ethnicity-gender categories to examine if teleworkability has benefited any particular group in
terms of lowering the likelihood of unemployment during the pandemic. In doing so, we use Dingel and
Neiman (2020) measure of the share of teleworkable jobs in an industry as an industry-specific
determinant of unemployment.
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As they note in their paper, this measure neglects many characteristics that would make working from home
difficult. Therefore, it is an upper bound on what might be feasible. Dingel and Neiman (2020) develop an
alternative measure based on individual introspection of different occupations, which leads to a relatively
conservative estimate of teleworkable jobs.
8 While beyond the scope of paper, it is important to note that teleworkability has many other determinants than
the nature of tasks accomplished on the job. Firm level differences in ability to invest and train employees, spatial
differences in infrastructure are among these reasons.
9 It should be noted that even though working from home is considered to be an insurance against losing one’s job
during this recession, for single parents and dual income earning parents, working from home combined with the
school closures imposes a unique disadvantage mostly felt by women. The ongoing childcare crisis due to the
closure of daycare centers and schools in March 2020 in the U.S. is likely to continue in 2020-21 school year. For
dual earner heterosexual parents, the already existing unequal distribution of time spent on child-care is likely to
constraint women’s time severely. This effect will also be felt disproportionately by single parents. Please see BLS
(2020) for the distribution of average daily time spent on childcare for women and men.
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Table 1: Employment share (%E) and the share of teleworkable jobs (%T) in the most segregated
industries
Women
African American
Latinx
E
T
E
T
E
T
Ground Passenger
Apparel
Social Assistance
84 39 Transport
31 18 Manufacturing
33 21
Nursing/Residential
Warehousing and
Care
81 16 Postal Service
27 8 Storage
32 17
Ambulatory
Nursing/Residential
Healthcare
79 26 Care
26 16 Construction
30 19
Couriers and
Admin/Support
Hospitals
75 21 Messengers
25 16 Services
30 31
Personal/Laundry
Warehousing and
Services
73 12 Storage
24 17 Food Manufacturing 30 10
Clothing Stores
70 7 Social Assistance
20 39 Accommodation
29 13
Education
70 83 Air Transportation
20 15 Agriculture
28 8
Before moving on to the empirical analysis of unemployment during the pandemic, Table 1
provides a picture of employment segregation and the degree of teleworking opportunities in the top five
industries in which women, Blacks and Latinx are overrepresented. For each group, the second column is
the employment share of the group within that industry (E) and the third column is the percentage of
teleworkable jobs in that industry, a la Dingel and Neiman (2020).10 The table shows that almost all
industries in which Blacks and Latinx are overrepresented have a lower-than-average share of
teleworkable jobs. In case of industry-specific shocks, such as COVID-19-related measures, more layoffs
are likely to occur in industries with fewer teleworkable jobs, leading to higher likelihood of
unemployment for Blacks and Latinx. This pattern is not as clear for women, since women are
overrepresented in education, an industry ranking relatively high on teleworkability. To get a better sense
of how these groups’ share of employment and teleworkability are aligned across all industries, we run a
simple OLS regression of the share of teleworkable jobs on the employment share of women, Blacks and
Latinx for 73 industries (Table 2). Unlike Alon et al. (2020), we do not find any significant relationship
between women’s employment share and the share of teleworkable jobs across industries, while the
relationship is significantly negative for Blacks and Latinx. These results confirm that in order to empirically
explore the differential unemployment likelihood of people of color during the pandemic, our framework
should incorporate not only industry-specific fixed effects, and essential/nonessential distinctions, but
also the degree of teleworkability across industries. Moreover, focusing on the separate race and gender
categories might obfuscate a negative relationship between the employment of women of color and the
degree of teleworkability.
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Based on the BLS Labor Force Statistics in 2019, men made up 47%, Whites 77.8%, African Americans 12.7%, and
Latinx 18% of the U.S. labor force. Industries included here are those with highest share of employment for
women, Black and Latinx among 73 industry categories (based on NAICS 2 and NAICS 3 classification) that we
matched to Dingel and Neiman’s measure of the share of teleworkable jobs in an industry. We used the relatively
conservative measure of telewokability, which was described in footnote 13. The unweighted average of
teleworkability index for all 73 industries in our sample 30%.

9

Table 2: Teleworkability, Gender and Race
Employment share of teleworkable jobs
Women employment share
0.181
(-0.126)
Black employment share
-0.881**
(-0.415)
Hispanic employment share
-1.603***
(-0.36)
Constant
57.560***
(-8.977)
Number of industries
73
Adj. R-sq
0.277
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
IV: Data on COVID-19 Unemployment
We use April 2020 CPS survey data to conduct our analysis of the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic on the probability of being unemployed in the U.S. and how race and gender contribute to this
probability. Most of the states which implemented lockdown measures began to do so in March 2020, so
April is the first month to fully display the effects of COVID-19 on the labor market. The reference period
is April 12-18, 2020. BLS warns users of CPS about a misclassification issue in the unemployment data
collected in March and April 2020, which leads to an underestimation of the national unemployment
rate.11 Considering the potential wide range for the actual unemployment rate, we use two different
definitions of COVID-19 unemployment: 12
1) Narrow COVID-19 unemployment: Individuals, identified as “job losers on layoff” (BLS
category), whose unemployment duration is up to and including 4 weeks, are included in this category.
This is a rather conservative definition of unemployment, which results in 10.5 million unemployed due
to COVID-19.
2) Upper-bound COVID-19 unemployed: In addition to the individuals in the narrow category, we
include “other job losers” whose unemployment duration is up to and including 4 weeks; those with
ending temporary jobs whose unemployment duration is up to and including 4 weeks; and those who
were “employed-but-absent” due to “other” reasons in the reference week that BLS identified as
misclassified. This measure results in 18.6 million unemployed.
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The BLS instructed surveyors to code those out of work due to the epidemic as recently laid off or unemployed,
but surveyors appeared to code at least some of them in the employed-but-absent category. According to the
estimates provided by BLS, out of 11.5 million workers classified as employed-but-absent in April 2020, around 7.5
million should have been classified as unemployed. If these people were to be coded as unemployed, the resulting
unemployment rate for April would be 19.2%, compared with the official estimate of 14.4% (not seasonally
adjusted).
12 We base our analysis on working age population (15-64). Individuals who report themselves as out of the labor
force are excluded from this analysis.

10

Table 3 presents a racial/ethnic-gender snapshot of the pool of COVID-19 unemployed based on
the narrow definition of unemployment. The table shows that 26% percent of the unemployed are White
men, and 29% are White women. Compared to the shares of White men and White women in the labor
force (44% and 38% respectively), these figures confirm that Whites are underrepresented amongst the
unemployed. Similarly, the fact that 55% of the unemployed are women, as compared to women making
up 49% of the labor force, signals the overrepresentation of women amongst the unemployed. Age and
education levels are among the other noteworthy COVID-19-unemployment characteristics: relatively
younger people aged 21-30 make up the largest age group (27%), and, in terms of educational attainment,
high school graduates represent the largest share of the unemployed at 55.3%.
Table 3: Cross tabulation of Race and Gender of COVID 19 unemployed
Race/Ethnicity

Men

Women

Total

White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Total
F(2.96, 9214.62)=

0.26
0.07
0.12
0.04
0.49
2.18

0.29
0.07
0.11
0.04
0.51
p = 0.09

0.55
0.14
0.23
0.08
1

In terms of occupational distribution, we see that 14% of the unemployed are in food preparation
and related occupations, followed by 11.3% in sales and related occupations. A closer look reveals that
from among food preparation and related occupations, 24.3% are waiters and waitresses, and 20.7% are
cooks. 41.5% of sales and related occupations is retail salespersons, and 20.9% are cashiers. In terms of
the industrial distribution of the unemployed, we see that leisure and hospitality comes first at 22%;
educational and health services follows at 17.5%; and wholesale and retail trade is a close third at 15.8%.
Agriculture, Mining, Public Administration, Information, and Financial Activities are among the sectors
with lowest numbers of unemployed (less than 2%).
V. Regression and Results
We use the April 2020 CPS micro data to examine how the intersection of race/ethnicity and
gender contribute to the probability of being unemployed due to the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. labor
market. In our analysis we use both narrow and upper-bound unemployment measures (as previously
defined). In addition to race/ethnicity-gender, we include labor supply characteristics such as age and
educational attainment as control variables that might affect an individual’s probability of becoming
unemployed. We use control variables to capture the differential impact of the COVID-19 recession on
different sectors and occupations, as well as the different responses of the state governments across
different regions. Finally, we include industry-specific essential/non-essential distinctions made by most
state governments, and the share of teleworkable jobs in industries among control variables with
potential impact on the probability of unemployment.
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Our benchmark model takes the following form:
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋) = 𝛷(𝛽 ′ 𝑋 + 𝑢)
where

𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖 = {

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷 19
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

𝛷 is the standard normal cumulative distribution, X is the vector of following independent variables:
•
Variable showing the race/ethnicity-gender intersection (six categories of White men, White
women, Black men, Black women, Hispanic men, Hispanic women)
• Control variables: age, and square of age, educational attainment (four categories of less than
high school or high school; associate degree; college degree; advanced degree), variable for the
degree of teleworkability in an industry expressed as percentage of jobs that can be worked
from home, a dummy variable indicating whether the industry is essential or not, variable for 23
occupations13, variable for 14 sectors14, variable for four regions (Northeast, Southwest,
Midwest, West).
β' is the parameter estimates, and u is the random error term. The parameters of particular
interest are those of the “race/gender” variable as they capture the disproportionate effect estimates of
COVID-19 unemployment on various intersectional groups. Table 4 shows the summary statistics for the
variables.
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean
St.
Min
Max
Type
Deviation
Unemploymentnarrow
0.05
0.22
0
1
Dummy
Unemploymentupperbound
0.09
0.28
0
1
Dummy
Race/gender
2.63
1.70
1
6
Categorical
Teleworkability
33.7
24.7
1.8
88.04 Continuous
Occupation
11.8
6.9
1
23
Categorical
Sector
7.8
3.07
1
14
Categorical
Education
1.89
1.11
1
4
Categorical
Age
39.7
14.15
15
64
Continuous
Essential
0.74
0.43
0
1
Dummy
Region
2.69
1.01
1
4
Categorical
Sample size
63,474
Notes: Individuals are weighted using composited final monthly weights provided by the BLS.
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The occupational categories are: management occupations, business and financial operations, computer and
mathematical science, architecture and engineering occupations, life, physical and social science, community and
social service occupations, legal occupations, education, training and library occupations, arts, design
entertainment and sports, healthcare practitioner and technicians, healthcare support occupations, protective
service occupations, food preparation and serving related occupations, building and grounds cleaning occupations,
personal care and service occupations, sales and related occupations, office and administrative support
occupations, farming, fishing and forestry occupations, construction and extraction occupations, installation,
maintenance and repair occupations, production occupations, transportation and material moving and armed
forces.
14 The categories are agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, transportation
and utilities, information, financial activities, professional and business services, educational and health services,
leisure and hospitality, other services, public administration, and armed forces.
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Table 5 shows the marginal effects from the probit regression results for both narrow and upper
bound unemployment measures. 15

Table 5: Probit Marginal Effects from Benchmark Model

White
Women
Black Men

Race/gender
(Reference category: White Men)

Black Women
Hispanic Men

Education
(Reference category: Less than high
school or high school)

Hispanic
Women
Associate
Degree
College
Advanced
Degree

Teleworkability
Essential

Model 1
Unemploymentnarrow

Model 2
Unemploymentupperbound

0.024***
(0.004)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.028***
(0.008)
0.010*
(0.005)
0.033***
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.005)
-0.015***
(0.004)
-0.04***
(0.005)
-0.0005***
(0.0001)
-0.068***
(0.005)

0.028***
(0.005)
0.034***
(0.01)
0.044***
(0.01)
0.023***
(0.007)
0.053***
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.035***
(0.006)
-0.071***
(0.007)
-0.0006***
(0.0001)
-0.10***
(0.006)

Other Control Variables
Age
Yes
Yes
Age squared
Yes
Yes
Region
Yes
Yes
Occupation
Yes
Yes
Sector
Yes
Yes
Sample Size
34,652
34,968
Notes: The dependent variable for Model 1 is narrow unemployment (0,1) and for Model 2 is upper bound
unemployment (0,1). The sample for Model 1 is composed of those who are unemployed by narrow
definition and employed workers. The sample for Model 2 is composed of those who are unemployed by
upper bound definition and employed workers. Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions use
composited final monthly weights provided by the BLS.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
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Logit and OLS regression estimations of the benchmark model also give similar results.
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Compared with White men, all race/ethnicity-gender groups have a higher probability of being
unemployed and the coefficients are statistically significant in both Models 1 and 2. Furthermore, in both
specifications, the probability of being unemployed is higher for women in each race/ethnicity category.
The largest probability of unemployment in comparison to that of White men is for Hispanic women,
followed by Black women (in both models). For Hispanic women, we see that holding these multiple
identities increases the probability of unemployment by 5% compared with White men (using the upperbound unemployment definition). Comparing narrow and upper-bound unemployment results shows that
the probabilities from the latter are always higher for each racial/ethnic-gender group. That the smallest
discrepancy between the results from narrow and upper-bound unemployment measures is for White
women might suggest the misclassification of unemployment is most predominant for people of color.
As expected, unemployment probability decreases with higher educational attainment, yet only
after a college degree - an Associate Degree does not insulate one from being unemployed compared with
high school graduates.16 Also, as expected, the probability of unemployment is lower for essential
industries. Based on the upper-bound definition of unemployment, the likelihood of becoming
unemployed seems to drop by 10% in essential industries compared to those classified as nonessential.
Finally, the teleworkability variable also has a negative marginal effect as expected: as the percentage of
jobs that can be done from home in an industry increases, the probability of being unemployed falls.
Given that being employed in an industry with more teleworkable jobs can lead, on average, to a
lower probability of being unemployed, we next explore whether this advantage is enjoyed by all
race/ethnicity-gender categories uniformly. To do so, we incorporate an interaction term of
race/ethnicity-gender and the degree of teleworkability to Models 1 and 2. Table 6 shows the marginal
effects of the race/ethnicity-gender intersection for the highest level of teleworkability in our dataset.

16

When we do not control for occupation or industry category, we see that the coefficient of educational
attainment category of Associate Degree becomes significant. Hence, we can state that occupational distribution
overlaps with educational attainment for lower educational attainment categories, in the sense that those who
have a higher unemployment probability are concentrated in occupational categories that employ relatively lower
educational attainment than a college degree.
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Table 6: Marginal Effects at Maximum Level of Teleworkability
Probit Regression Marginal Effects when Teleworkability=88.1
Model 3
Model 4
Narrow
Upper bound
Unemployment
Unemployment
Race/ ethnicity and gender
White Women
0.001
-0.006
(Reference category: White
(0.007)
(0.01)
Men)
Black Men
0.024
0.039
(0.018)
(0.03)
Black Women
0.04**
0.06***
(0.019)
(0.023)
Hispanic Men
0.002
0.044*
(0.015)
(0.022)
Hispanic
0.05***
0.07***
Women
(0.017)
(0.021)
Control variables
Yes
Yes
Age
Yes
Yes
Age Squared
Yes
Yes
Education
Yes
Yes
Occupation
Yes
Yes
Sector
Yes
Yes
Region
Essential

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Sample Size
34,652
34,968
Notes: The dependent variable for Model 3 narrow unemployment (0,1) and for Model 4 is upper bound
unemployment (0,1). The sample for Model 3 is composed of those who are unemployed by narrow
definition and employed workers. The sample for Model 4 is composed of those who are unemployed by
upper bound definition and employed workers. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions use
composited final monthly weights provided by the BLS.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
The marginal effects in Table 6 show that even when the share of teleworkable jobs is at a
maximum in an industry, the unemployment probability for Black women and Hispanic women is higher
than that of White men regardless of unemployment definition. The disproportionate likelihood is quite
sizeable based on the upper-bound unemployment measure: Black women are 6% more likely to be
unemployed than White men, and Hispanic women are 7% more likely to be unemployed than White men
within industries that have the highest degree of teleworkability. Although smaller, a significant
disproportionate likelihood of unemployment also exists for Hispanic men, but only based on the upperbound unemployment measure. Finally, the higher likelihood of unemployment that White women and
Black men were previously shown to have experienced relative to White men seems to disappear if they
are employed in industries with highly teleworkable jobs. The top five industries with the highest share of
teleworkable jobs are in the Information and the Finance and Insurance sectors of the economy. Being
employed in these sectors seem to have insulated White women from the disproportionate
unemployment effects of the COVID-19 recession.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
Our analysis shows that controlling for labor supply characteristics, geographical regions,
occupations, sectors of the economy, essential/nonessential classification, and the degree of
teleworkability of industries, women and minorities have been disproportionately affected by COVID-19
in terms of job loss. This general finding is in line with the literature, which shows that the current
recession’s initial effects have been felt disproportionately by women and by minorities in terms of job
loss probability. Our focus on intersectionality allows us to go beyond a uniform approach to gender: we
also identify the magnitude of unemployment probability associated with holding multiple identities.
Specifically, we find the most disadvantaged group to be Hispanic women, who are 5.3% more likely to
be unemployed, followed by Black women, who have 4.4 % higher likelihood compared to White men
based on an upper-bound unemployment definition. Hispanic men are the group with the smallest
disproportionate unemployment probability compared to White men, with a 2.3% higher likelihood. We
further find that working in an industry with highly teleworkable jobs does not spare Hispanic women
and Black women from disproportionate job losses. Hispanic women working in industries with a high
degree of ability to work from home are 7% more likely, and Black women are 6% more likely to become
unemployed compared to White men. It appears that the pandemic is making the already built-in
racial/ethnic and gendered structural disparities in the labor market more pronounced, especially for
women of color. As we control for industry and occupation categories, and other variables that have
been found to be important determinants of cyclical unemployment differential with respect to gender
and/or race/ethnicity, the remaining differences cannot be explained by industrial and/or occupational
segregation of these different groups.
One reason for the higher probability of unemployment for people of color could be the relative
difficulty of securing Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans by minority owned businesses. These
loans are designed to provide an additional incentive for small businesses to keep their employees on
payroll during this recession. Although we do not have any access to data that show who received the
PPP loans, several surveys conducted by various NGOs point to Black and Latinx small businesses have
had difficulty receiving these loans: UnidosUS for example report that only 1 in 10 minority owned
business was able to get the funds that they asked for. 17
Another possible explanation for the additional unemployment probability especially for
Hispanic and Black women is discrimination. Discrimination in hiring and firing practices has been
identified as an unobservable source of “last-hired, first-fired” pattern notable in the employment
trends of Black workers. For example, Couch and Fairlie (2010) suggest that during recessions, beyond
layoffs based on observable characteristics, a discriminating employer can lay off equally qualified Blacks
and not face economic costs for doing so. In the current recession, this effect might have worked mostly
to the disadvantage of Hispanic and Black women. However, discrimination is not typically directly
observed in the labor market data. Given the available data and the methodology we use, we are not
able to test for the role of discrimination in explaining the higher likelihood of unemployment of
Hispanic and Black women. Nevertheless, we give our best effort by incorporating all available
individual, occupational, industry-level determinants of unemployment during recessions cited in the
literature, as well other variables unique to the COVID-19 recession. As more data become available,
combined with more qualitative studies, we might be able to understand the additional hardship
experienced by women and by minorities during the COVID-19 pandemic.
17

https://www.unidosus.org/about-us/media/press/releases/051820-UnidosUS-Press-Release-COVID-19-SurveyBlack-and-Latino-Small-Business
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In addition to the PPP loans, a federally legislated fiscal impetus program, CARES Act, passed in
March 27, 2020 provided for Economic Impact Payments to American households of up to $1,200 per
adult for individuals whose income was less than $99,000. As the unemployment now stands at 11.1 %,
it is obvious that this one-shot stimulus payment will not be enough for women and minority workers to
maintain their livelihoods. Under CARES act there is also the Pandemic Unemployment Compensation
program which added a $600 weekly boost to Unemployment Insurance payments which is going to be
terminated at the end of July 31, 2020. Given that minorities and women are disproportionately
affected by this recession and that Black, Latinx and low-income households have less access to liquid
assets (Ganong et al 2020), it remains a question how these workers will survive when the program
expires.18 In our opinion, continuing this program is vital for the well-being of minority population and
women.
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